Quantum Hack : Discovering Hidden Vulnerabilities in Quantum Communication Security

Craig: recent research from the university of toronto, go toronto, has uncovered significant vulnerabilities in quantum communication protocols that challenge established assumptions about quantum security. these issues create opportunities for sophisticated quantum hacking techniques that may compromise even the most advanced systems. what do you think about this, john?

Jon: yeah. so we're gonna get into some really, technical things again when it comes to quantum. so, just just to kind of talk through some things here. so, while mdi qkd, solved some detector side vulnerabilities in 2012, there was still source side flaws demand, which demanded a paradigm shift. so passive qkd sources bypass modulators entirely. but legacy systems relying on active modulation, they have to address these distortions. so there's a challenge to patching cryptographic protocols mid deployment, if that makes sense. so the assumption is that encoding stays uncorrelated with other degrees of freedom. so that's quantum's trusted hardware fallacy. so then violations in active sources, they create multidimensional side channels, which is now forcing us to rethink how we certify quantum devices. so how do we future proof quantum security? virtual channel protocols, which replace real channels with private space hilbert filters, could preemptively eliminate side channels. and then if you pair this with passive qkd sources, that might offer a zero trust quantum infrastructure. and what the hell is a hilbert filter? right? so, a hilbert filter, it's a signal processing tool. so it implements the hilbert transform, it shifts the phase of all frequency components of a signal by 90 degrees. so the filter is used in applications that require generation of an analytic signal. and so the analytic signal is particularly useful in communication modulation and envelope detection. so using older school technology, implementing this with oh, by the way, qkd is quantum key distribution. i know we talked about it before. but just, to let people know, qkd is quantum key distribution. so, i love this because they're already finding flaws in quantum security and ways to hack it, and they're already, coming up with ways to patch it. what do you think about this?

Craig: yeah.

Jon: it's a lot to

Craig: it's a lot to take in, and so i'm gonna get into some of the technicalities in a minute. but, you know, we were talking about how secure some of this quantum security was gonna be in quantum secure hardware. and i was just saying, well, we'll have to wait and see exactly this type of thing. what are the side channel type effects? because you don't know until security people have studied it and, lo and behold, here we go. so at the core of the reacher's finding is the concept of, like you said, the hidden multidimensional modulation, which describes how unintended correlations can develop between properties of quantum states being transmitted. time varying modulation creates correlations between encoded information and unintentional degrees of freedom enabling undetectable side channel attacks. if that's, you know, hard to comprehend. i liken it to, electromagnetic side channel, attacks and analysis, which have been going on for a long time. and a good example of that is vaneck freaking. you know what van eck freaking is? no. okay.

Jon: so this

Craig: has been up for a while. i thought it

Jon: was freaking is, but

Craig: i don't know. freaking is electronic devices emit electronic electromagnetic radiation as a byproduct of their operation. like, you got something on, it just happens. so crt monitors and to a lesser extent, lcd monitors and other screens can emit signals that correspond closely to the images on the screen with the right radio

Jon: equipment i heard about this. i didn't know that was the name. sorry.

Craig: yeah. with the right radio equipment and signal processing, it's possible to pick out the emissions and reconstruction reconstruct the display output from a distance. so not looking at it, not at you're at the back of the screen, you can still see what they're doing. and that's because of the electromagnetic signal. it's a side channel attack because, you know, they can't everything can be encrypted, but they can still see what's on your screen. it's you know, if it's unencrypted to your eyes, it's gonna be unencrypted to them. another side channel. so that's called van eck freaking, and, it's real it was great when i first read it about it ages ago and some really cool concepts, but that's the type of stuff that's happening here. so in order to do quantum communication and quantum, key, distribution distribution. yeah. it's an active thing. they have to change the particle.

Jon: so by just observe it.

Craig: by actively doing that, like, from a communications point, you have to change it so it changes on the other end. by actively doing that, you're doing something. you're using energy. you're using this. you're using that, and you're disturbing the stuff around it that can now be detected, and people are starting to use the these side channels. i was just trying to bring that down to a level people might understand. so

Jon: thank you.

Craig: the mdi qkd, which was you were talking about, usually mitigates, certain vulnerabilities, and the b b eight four is widely utilized protocol that shows in, an increased susceptibilities to these newly discovered side channels. so, this is interesting, obviously, but you're like you were saying, by eliminating active modulation, they remove the root cause of these hidden correlations. so, the problem is this is much more difficult, passively changing at a distance, and these things are much more difficult. so it's interesting that we're seeing this already, the vulnerabilities even though that quantum computers really aren't widely available to people, and, you know, are questionable in value in the first place right now based on, you know, error rates and how long they can perform for before, you know, they die, like, a, how long they can calculate something before they their lose their mind.

Jon: yeah. yeah.

Craig: yeah. there's a thing called that. i lose my mind for that. so there's a business impact in compromised quantum security as people started moving forward, and we got all this comp quantum, secure stuff. so there's gonna be delay in security deployment timelines and concerns over investment and potential vulnerable systems. so we'll have to keep an eye on this. do you think it's gonna slow things down much, john?

Jon: no. i like that they're doing this now before quantum gets, becomes mainstream, if it ever does become mainstream because, this is great. they're probably learning from, the early computer developments where there was tons of vulnerabilities, and they were just learning about them. and it took them years to figure them out and patch them up. this is good that they're approaching this now to, and, hopefully, this will, help to commercialize quantum quicker as well by patching these vulnerabilities.

Craig: yeah. these findings underscore the need for continuous adaptation and security strategies as quantum technologies evolve. the path ahead involves rigorous investigation and collaboration to ensure the quantum communication deliver the unprecedent unprecedented security they promise. love to hear your thoughts on this quantum security communication and if you think we're gonna start to see more and more different vulnerabilities appear. just because we think it's secure doesn't mean it actually is. love to hear your thoughts.